Ospery, the bird of the Selous Scouts.Selous Scouts "Pamwe Chete" title block.Ospery, the bird of the Selous Scouts.






























Movement Security

Scouts mounted, pulling security off flanks.


  1. During ATOPS there is the ever-present danger of vehicles being ambushed by terrorists. The risk of ambushes varies depending on the nature of the terrain and enemy activity.
  2. The various aims of terrorist ambushes are to:
    1. Inflict damage to security force vehicles.
    2. Obtain much-needed supplies such as ammunition, weapons and/or equipment.
    3. Inflict casualties and lower the morale of the military forces.
    4. Create a feeling of insecurity and disrupt the normal routine in an area.
    5. Prevent the tactical and/or logistical movement by security forces.
    6. Improve own morale and sense of achievement.
    7. Acquire support for their cause locally and internationally.
  3. The effectiveness of enemy ambushes is dependent on the following:
    1. Selection of a site providing good cover and safe escape routes.
    2. The gaining, from various sources, of information regarding the movement of military forces, thereby giving themselves the opportunity to plan in great detail and, if possible, even rehearse the operation, thereby also achieving surprise.
    3. If necessary, blocking the road with craters, trees, vehicles or other obstacles. Mines and booby traps may also be used.
    4. Vulnerability of soft-skinned vehicles.
    5. Armaments and/or weapons at their disposal.
    6. The importance of routes necessary for the logistical support or tactical movement of military forces.
  4. To a degree, the effectiveness of enemy ambushes can be countered, or at least reduced, by a high standard of training, good convoy discipline, good immediate action drills, good security, and the classification of routes and roads.


  1. General. It may be necessary to introduce a road classification system in the event of terrorist activity in the ambushing of convoys and/or vehicles reaching serious proportions. Roads are classified into three main categories:
    1. Unrestricted (green roads).
    2. Conditional (yellow roads).
    3. Restricted (red roads).
  2. Unrestricted roads (green). Road which are free of enemy threat or activity and require no special precautionary measures. Movement of military as well as civilian vehicles or persons is unrestricted and military personnel may travel unarmed, and in any type of vehicle. This classification will be laid down by the appropriate senior headquarters or civil authority. However, a local civil military authority may impose certain restrictions of a temporary nature, if considered necessary.
  3. Conditional roads (yellow). Roads along which limited enemy activity can be expected. Consequently movement is permitted with certain precautionary measures being necessary. These are:
    1. All military personnel transported in military or civilian vehicles must be armed.
    2. Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the driver, and under certain conditions, military vehicles may not be allowed to move individually.
    3. Military personnel may travel alone in civilian vehicles but must be armed.
    4. Under certain conditions it may be necessary to restrict all movement to daylight only and to packets of vehicles.
    5. Tighter control of all convoy movements.
  4. Restricted roads (red). Roads on which enemy activity is an ever-present risk in any form. For this reason, these roads can only be used by escorted or guarded convoys. Conditions governing movement on these roads are:
    1. All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one other armed man besides the driver.
    2. Travel at night will be restricted to moves of operational necessity.
    3. Movement of single military vehicles is not permitted.
    4. Troop convoys of operational units will be primarily responsible for their own protection, but the fullest use will be made of available armored vehicles as escort.
    5. Administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible.
    6. It is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render mutual assistance in case of an emergency, but not so close that an ambush is likely to involve several vehicles.
    7. Intervals between vehicles will normally depend on the type of terrain, but visual contact between vehicles must be maintained (50-150m). Armored escort vehicles are to move within this overall density so as to position themselves where they are best able to give protection.
    8. Non-operational convoys and civilian vehicles are not to be moved without the authority of the formation headquarters responsible for the area concerned, to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for escorts.
    9. Restricted roads may be further subdivided into sections, and special precautions for each section of road may be laid down. Whenever possible, helicopters or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance duties and to assist in controlling convoys.



  1. The safety of a route depends on certain aspects such as enemy activity, terrain and resources (e.g., vehicles and manpower). There are certain measures which may be taken to ensure safe movement. These are:
    1. Fixed defense. This is based on a series of strong points such as villages, bridges, crossings and areas of likely enemy ambushes, normally linked by patrols. It may be either permanent or temporary.
    2. Mobile protection. This consists of mobile patrols that move out from defended posts or military bases to clear the routes, in particular just prior to convoys using them.
    3. Picquetting. This is essentially a preventive tactic and aims at ensuring the unmolested passage of a convoy or patrol along a selected route.
    4. Escorts. Either on or accompanying the convoy.
  2. Fixed Defense

    Permanent nature. This system is gradually developed by first establishing strong points at places such as villages and important installations and developing from there to include bridges, crossings, etc. The selection of the points will be governed by the degree of protection that each may require and the degree of enemy influence in the area. It is hoped that these measures in due course result in unrestricted travel. In the permanent concept, the following is applicable:

    1. Troops are deployed and operate as described in Chapter 12.
    2. It is mainly an infantry task. Additional support may be provided, when necessary.
  3. Temporary nature. This system entails the utilization of small units of infantry tactically prepositioned at vulnerable points along the route, to be used prior to the commencement of the movement and remaining in their positions until the convoy has passed. The strength and positioning of these groups will be determined by:
    1. Enemy activity and possible enemy strength and assistance.
    2. The nature of the point, i.e., bridge, crossing, cutting, etc.
    3. The nature of the surrounding terrain because patrol action may be necessary to clear the areas.
  4. The two above-mentioned methods require careful planning and execution. The disadvantage of this system is the requirement of many troops.
  5. Mobile Protection

    Mobile patrols. This task would normally be given to reconnaissance units and armored and/or scout cars. In their absence, infantry units can also carry out these tasks using infantry combat vehicles or armored personnel carriers. The composition and strength of these patrols will be determined by the following:

    1. The task of the patrol.
    2. Enemy tactics, e.g., the use of mines, booby traps, obstacles such as ditches, felled trees or ambushes. At times, engineer elements will have to be included.
    3. The type and number of routes to be patrolled.
    4. The nature of the terrain.
    5. The availability of own resources.
  6. When making use of mobile patrols, the responsible headquarters or commander must determine the best patrol program to ensure that all main routes are patrolled and that enemy activity is reduced to the minimum by making best use of the forces available.
  7. Precautions against possible mining and action to be taken on encountering mines are laid down in Chapter 14 of this manual. Regular routes and timings should be avoided and strict security must be maintained to minimize possible enemy reaction.
  8. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary to send a mobile patrol along a route or into an area that may have been under enemy influence for some time. The composition of the force will vary, but will normally consist of a reconnaissance element reinforced with infantry and with attached engineer elements. In this case the suggested grouping and tasks are as follows:
    1. A clearing group moving in front with flank protection with the task of clearing the road.
    2. Search groups working on both sides of the route up to a depth of 300 to 400 meters, depending on the terrain. Their task is to search the verges and adjacent terrain to clear any possible enemy ambushes. They should move well forward, and, if necessary, provide flank protection to the clearing group and mutually support each other.
    3. Command group, which is vehicle-borne and moves just to the rear of the clearing group.
    4. Fire support group with the task of providing immediate fire support to any of the groups. This can consist of an armored car or other suitable mobile weapon system and should move in the rear of the command group.
    5. Reserve group moving mounted and at the rear of the patrol. This group must be able to go to the assistance of any group immediately.
    6. The above-described type of patrol is time-consuming and requires a lot of effort; consequently it should not be used to clear a long route and should be used only when absolutely necessary.
  9. If available, air support should also be provided for this type of patrol, and artillery fire support, preplanned and prepositioned, will give added protection against possible enemy reaction.
  10. Picquetting

    Picquetting is a very effective method of ensuring safe passage over selected routes either by determining that there are no terrorists along the route or, if there are, by preventing them from interfering with the movement of the column. Picquets may also be used to secure a route which has been cleared of mines.

  11. Picquetting is expensive in manpower, time-consuming, and requires thorough training and preparation. Small groups of men, up to section strength, are placed at strategic points along the route, normally on high ground. Helicopters greatly facilitate deployment.
  12. Types. Picquets can be either static or mobile, depending on the number of troops available and the characteristics of the selected route (length, terrain, etc.).
    1. Static. Static picquets are deployed along the entire length of the selected route and afford maximum security for movement.
    2. Mobile. Mobile picquets surround and move with the column, acting as a protective cocoon. They are not as effective as static picquets in that they do not secure the entire route. Mobile picquets can be either vehicle-borne or foot patrols. Their prime object is to check all high ground and likely ambush positions. moving under mobile picquet protection slows down the column, and to attain maximum speed a comprehensive picquet drill is essential. Picquetting headquarters must be established to best advantage in the column, preferably closest to the column headquarters, with which it must have radio communication. Picquet areas must be selected quickly. Previous study of maps and air photographs assist in this. As picquets are posted, the next troops for picquettinq must take their place in readiness. Rear picquets are withdrawn by the picquetting headquarters on orders from the column headquarters.
    3. Command and control. Picquets should be within visual distance of each other and must be in radio communication with each other, and with the picquetting headquarters column. Units should have operational standing orders to cover picquetting drill and be trained in it. Standing orders should cover posting of picquets and the use of picquetting logs, orders to picquet commanders, action of the picquet on arrival in its area and the procedure for withdrawing picquets.
  13. Escorts

    In the event of other systems not proving adequate in the protection of movement against enemy action, an escort system will have to be used to give the added protection. Escorts may also be used in lieu of the other systems mentioned. This protection may be necessary for military and civilian movement.

  14. To facilitate the protection to be given by the escorts, convoys should not be too large and very strict standing orders should be laid down.
  15. The composition, grouping and strength of escorts will be determined by the following:
    1. Nature and size of the convoy.
    2. Expected enemy activity, possible strength and tactics.
    3. Nature of route and terrain to be passed through.
    4. own resources available.
  16. The escorting force with an appointed escort commander must be interspersed in the convoy, providing for front, internal and rear protection. it is usual to lead with an armored reconnaissance element with the necessary infantry and engineer backup elements, and to bring up the rear with armored reconnaissance elements. These may consist of only one armored or scout car.
  17. It is preferable that the convoy and escort commanders move close to each other. In the event of encountering the enemy, the escort commander assumes overall command for the conduct of any counter-measures.
  18. Distances between vehicles will be determined by the terrain and the nature of the route. However, contact must be from front to rear and rear to front and vehicles must move close enough to each other to be able to provide mutual support, if necessary. Leading vehicles must only proceed when it is ascertained that rear vehicles are following.
  19. In the event of there being no armored vehicles available, the escort will be made up of infantry elements, the strength depending on the size of the convoy. In this case the leading vehicle should be a heavy type adequately prepared against possible mine blasts and, if possible, equipped with mine- detecting equipment.
  20. When only an infantry escort is used, the escort commander should be responsible for the following:
    1. Visual contact must be maintained between vehicles.
    2. Each vehicle must carry an armed escort in the cab with the driver to be able to apply the brakes and turn off the engine if necessary.
    3. Each vehicle should have armed escorts in the rear and, if possible, at least one automatic weapon to each vehicle. Smoke and normal grenades should also be carried by the escorting troops.
    4. If possible, a prior air reconnaissance of the route concerned should be made, but care must be taken not to alert' the enemy of possible future moves.
    5. Air cover while the move is being conducted.
    6. Good radio communications throughout the length of the convoy and with the convoy commander. 3
  21. Escorts are there to provide protection to convoys and therefore detailed planning and briefing are vital to the success of their actions. They may be drawn from any unit or even from within the unit concerned. Thus all troops must have a high standard of training in escort duties and immediate action drills in the event of encountering enemy action.


1. For the purpose of this manual a convoy is defined as a group of two or more vehicles.

2. Principles. For the planning, movement and Organization of military convoys, the following principles will apply:

    a. Troop convoys of tactical units will provide their own protection and use may be made of armored vehicles should they be available. 

    b. Since the enemy is liable to attack any part of the convoy, protection must be evenly distributed throughout the convoy. 

    c. Contact between vehicles must be visual from front to rear. 

    d. Basic organizations must be maintained to ensure an even distribution of fire support and firepower throughout the convoy. 

    e. Radio contact must at all times be maintained between the convoy 3 commander, escort commander, and sub-units and/or units under command and, in addition, with the superior headquarters and units en route. 

    f. A high standard of security at all times. 

    g. Good convoy standing orders.


3. Unit standing orders for convoys. Every unit should have comprehensive orders covering movement by road based on the classification system described above. These orders should state clearly who is authorized to put a convoy on the road and should cover in detail the following points:

    a. The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders. 

    b. The Organization of the convoy. 

    c. The weapons and ammunition to be carried. Automatic weapons should be included. 

    d. The state of vehicles, e.g., detailed instructions regarding canopies, tailboards and windscreens and their protection against land mines. 

    e. Immediate action drills. 

    f. Security measures, including arrangements for destruction of classified material or documents, it necessary.

4. Security. It is essential that the movement of convoys should never become a routine matter and that the maximum precautions are taken to prevent the terrorists gaining advance information of vehicle movement. in this connection it should be remembered that:

    a. The telephone system is not secure. 

    b. Radio messages in clear can be picked up on an ordinary civilian-type receiver. 

    c. The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed, although they are subjected to screening. 

    d. Troops tend to be talkative both inside and outside their lines. In short, the fewer people who know about the timing, route and composition of a convoy before it sets out, the better. Generally, drivers and escorts should be warned as late as possible and the use of alternative routes and other deception measures should be planned.

5. The convoy commander. The convoy commander is not necessarily the senior officer or non-commissioned officer traveling in a convoy. He should position himself where he considers he can best control the convoy. He should inspect and check the vehicles when they are loaded and prepared. Should there be an escort, he should liaise with the escort commander prior to his briefing.

6. Briefing. Briefing by the convoy commander before moving off must be detailed and explicit. All drivers, including civilians, vehicle commanders and men traveling in the convoy should be present at the briefing. The briefing should include:

    a. Details of timings, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact and what to do should contact be broken or vehicles breakdown. 

    b. The distribution of any extra weapons. 

    c. The allocation of men to vehicles and their duties en route. 

    d. The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and sentries, and details of action to be taken in the event of contact with the enemy. 

    e. Communications.

A comprehensive example of road movement orders is given in Section 7 of this chapter.

7. Alertness.

    a. It must be impressed on all that a high degree of alertness is absolutely essential when moving along routes where enemy ambush is likely.

    b. Vehicle commanders. A commander must be detailed by name for each vehicle. His tasks will be to post sentries, ensure that all personnel are alert and assist in convoy control. He must travel in the rear of the vehicle and not with the driver. He will indicate to the troops traveling in the vehicle which side to debus by giving the command "Debus left or right." 

    c. Vehicle sentries. With the exception of smaller vehicles, four sentries should be posted in the back of each troop-carrying vehicle. The two sentries at the front must observe to the front and to their respective sides, the two in the rear must observe to the rear and to their respective sides. Where possible, these sentries should be armed with automatic weapons and smoke grenades. It is the task of the sentries to take immediate action in the event of an ambush and to cover troops dismounting from the vehicle, should it be brought to a halt. Light machine guns and heavy barrel rifles should be evenly distributed throughout the convoy. 

    d. The sentry system can be adopted to suit the different types of vehicles.

8. Preparation of vehicles.

    a. Men traveling in vehicles must be able to see in all directions, be able to use their weapons or throw grenades over vehicle sides without hindrance, and debus quickly. For these reasons a vehicle such as a three-tonner or one-tonner should have its canopy and canopy-framework removed and the tailboard down. Alternatively, the canopy-framework can be left on and canopies rolled up to give protection against weather conditions. The framework must not, however, restrict the speed of debussing. 

    b. All vehicles should be sandbagged. Should this not be possible, the leading three or four vehicles and all vehicles carrying gas, fuel, ammunition etc., must be sandbagged. The areas to be covered are the floors of the driving compartment and the areas over the rear wheels. Sand-filled maize bags should be used whenever space permits, as these provide greater protection than the conventional sandbag. 

    c. Folded down or removed windscreens will eliminate the danger of glass splinters causing injury to driver and passenger; however, bearing in mind the wind and dust, it is advisable to retain the windscreens. 

    d. Should windscreens be removed or folded down, a metal bar or some device must be erected on the front end of the vehicle to protect the driver and other personnel against wires strung across the road. 

    e. The rear flap must be removed or put down to facilitate rapid debussing. 

    f. If possible, automatic weapons must be placed on the roof of the cab of the leading vehicle to be able to fire immediately to the front or flanks. Automatic weapons mounted 'on following vehicles must cover alternate sides of the route. 

    g. Several vehicles must be equipped with false antennae to prevent the enemy from identifying which are actual command vehicles. 

    h. Any damaged vehicle that cannot be immediately repaired must either be taken along with the convoy or left with a sufficiently strong protection party. Should this not be possible, it must be rendered useless to the enemy and abandoned. Only under exceptional circumstances will it be destroyed, e.g., when there will be no possible chance of recovering it.

9. The loading of personnel-carrying vehicles.

    a. Next to the driver there must be a man ready to protect him; he should also be able to drive or at least apply the brake, cut off the engine and stop the vehicle properly. 

    b. The number of troops carried in vehicles must be restricted in order to ensure freedom of movement. 

    c. If possible, troops should be seated in the middle of the vehicle, facing outward. 

    d. The kit of troops traveling in the vehicle must be neatly stacked in a line down the middle of the vehicle. Where the vehicle has the seats down the middle, the kit will be packed away neatly under the seats.

10. Smoke. Phosphorous smoke grenades, besides producing an immediate, effective smoke screen, can inflict painful phosphorous burns and are useful anti-ambush weapons.

11. Alarm system. An alarm system must be arranged beforehand so that all the vehicles in the convoy, especially those without radio, can be warned immediately.

12. Precautionary measures. Convoys should stop when approaching a likely ambush area and personnel should move forward on foot to clear the area.


1. Whatever precautions are taken and preparations made, the ambush, when it is s rung, will always be an unexpected encounter. Immediate action drills are simple courses of action designed to deal with this type of problem. They aim at immediate, positive and offensive action.

2. The terrorist will spring his ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and converted into a position from which he can kill security forces by firing at them, normally from above, often at point-blank range. The principle behind the immediate action drill dealt with in this section is that it is incorrect to halt in the area which the terrorist has chosen as a killing ground and so covered by fire -- unless forced to do so. The drill, therefore, is to endeavor to drive on when fired upon, to halt only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counter-attack immediately from flank to rear.

Immediate Action Techniques

3. The killing ground. This is the area in which effective terrorist fire can be brought to bear. In order that the terrorists may not have the advantage of opening fire on ground of their own choosing, every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the killing ground. Thus when vehicles are fired upon:

    a. Drivers are not to stop, but are to attempt to drive on out of the killing ground. 

    b. Sentries are to fire immediately to keep the terrorists down. 

    c. When vehicles are clear of the killing ground, they are to be stopped to allow their occupants to debus and carry out offensive action. 

    d. Following vehicles approaching the killing ground are not to attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush, but are to halt clear of the area to allow their occupants to take offensive action.

4. Where vehicles have not been able to drive clear of the area under fire, troops are to debus under the covering fire of the lookout men, which should include smoke if possible, and are to make for cover on the side of the road. The actual bailing out drill is dealt with in greater detail later in this section.


5. Action when no troops have entered the killing ground. The escort commander or convoy commander, or in his absence the senior vehicle commander present, is to launch an immediate flanking attack on the terrorist position, leaving on the ground as supporting fire such weapons as light machine guns and light mortars.

6. Action when all troops are clear ahead of the killing ground. In this case it will be difficult to put in an attack as quickly as in paragraph 5 above, because troops will be moving away from the scene of action. Nevertheless, an encircling attack must be mounted as quickly as troops can be marshaled and brought back to a starting point. It is difficult to preplan who should take the initiative in these circumstances and it must be made clear, at the convoy commander's briefing, whether the rearmost vehicle commanders are to act on their own initiative in this type of situation.

7. Action when some troops are clear ahead of the killing ground and others are halted short of it. With two parties on each side of the ambush, confusion may arise as to which group should put in the attack against the insurgents and time may be wasted in getting the attack under way. If both parties attack at the same time without coordination, an inter-unit clash may result. It is suggested, therefore, that the party which has not yet entered the ambush make the attack as in paragraph 5 above.

8. Scout car tactics. Usually the best way in which a scout car can assist in counter-ambush action is by driving right up to the killing ground to engage the terrorists at short range. In this way it will probably be able:

    a. To give good covering fire to the flanking attack. 

    b. To afford protection to any of the troops caught in the terrorist killing ground. It is vital for a prearranged signal to have been agreed upon between the armored and dismounted troops, so that the supporting fire can be stopped before the actual assault.

9. Command and control. It is always possible that the escort or convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the terrorists' initial burst of fire. He may be pinned down in the killing ground or be on the wrong side of it when the ambush is sprung. In order to ensure that there is always a nominated commander on the spot, whatever the situation, it is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counter-attack. This should be clearly laid down in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing before moving off.

10. Debussing drill. The enemy will attempt to stop the vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles. He then tries to inflict maximum 6 casualties before the troops can debus. When a vehicle is forced to stop in an ambush, the troops must debus instantly.

    a. The vehicle commander is to shout "Debus right" or "Debus left" to indicate the direction in which troops are to muster.

    b. Sentries are to throw grenades and open fire immediately on the terrorist position. 

    c. Troops are to debus over both sides of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated. 

    d. As soon as troops are clear of the vehicle, sentries are to debus and join the remainder. 

    e. At this stage of the battle the aim must be to collect the fit men to e form a body for counter-action. Wounded troops must be dealt with after counter-action has been taken.

11. Training. Debussing drills must be practiced often by vehicle loads, e.g., infantry sections and platoons. When miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a journey, two or three practices must be held before the convoy moves off.

12. Logistical convoys. In the case of purely logistical convoys the protective measures detailed in Section 3 of this chapter will be applicable.


1. As for road movement, railway and train protection can be achieved by means of a fixed defense system whereby bridges, tunnels, junctions, workshops, shunting yards and engineering works are protected.

2. Added to the above, mobile patrols and train escorts will provide additional protection.

3. Mobile patrols may take the following form:

    a. Armed escorts transported in light armored wagons that precede the train. These elements act as a deterrent to possible enemy ambushes and may also serve to detect any possible mines that may have been laid by the enemy. 

    b. Patrols, either moving on foot or traveling in light wagons or armored type of self-driven railway vehicles, with the aim of constantly patrolling the railway line, thereby denying the enemy the opportunity of mining or damaging the railway line or setting up ambushes.

4. Additional precautions are the possible checking of freight and passengers and their luggage, and the clearance of a restricted zone extending up to 400 meters on both sides of the railway line. It may even be necessary to relocate packets of the local population that may be situated adjacent to or near the railway line.

5. The protection of railways presents a particularly different type of problem because the train moves on a pair of steel rails along a set route. This makes it extremely easy for the enemy either to impede all movement by damaging either one or both rails or by ambushing the line. Usually there is no alternative route. 

6. For the above-mentioned reasons a very carefully planned and executed scheme n is vital for the protection of railway or trains.



1. The following is a comprehensive layout of a road movement order and would rarely be used in its entirety. Furthermore, a great deal of the contents would normally be included in unit standing orders. Unit/sub-unit commanders are to take this example as a guide and use only those portions that apply to any particular situation.


2. Terrain.

    a. General characteristics of route. Classification of various sections. 

    b. Road sections and critical places:

        1. Possible enemy actions. 

        2. Movement difficulties.

    c. Enemy infiltration points and their relation to the route to be utilized. 

    d. Suitable places for fixed defense. 

    e. Zones which, by their nature, make it possible for our troops to be hit by their own fire, e.g., "S" bends. 

    f. Meteorological conditions pertaining to the route (tides, rain, fog, etc.). 

    g. Alternative routes. 

    h. Use of charts, photographs or maps.

3. Enemy forces.

    a. Organization and possible strength in the area. 

    b. Individual characteristics of the leader or leaders. 

    c. Normal operational techniques (places, times, etc.).

4. Local population.

    a. Attitude towards the enemy and towards military forces. 

    b. Settlements to be passed through or in close proximity to the route. Tribal authorities. 

    c. Habits and movements.

5. Friendly forces.

    a. Allocated technical maintenance or support elements or sub-units (sappers, mine detectors, etc.). 

    b. Support Organization or other installations existing along the route.


6. As determined by higher authority.


7. Task, composition and deployment of the escort if applicable.

8. Composition and grouping of the column (including the position of each vehicle).

9. Distribution of personnel and weapons in the vehicles. Appointment of vehicle commanders and sentries.

10. Tasks of sub-units during the movement, if applicable.

11. Individual tasks during the movement.

12. Immediate actions, security measures.

    a. As a whole. 

    b. Per vehicle; preparation of vehicle; protection against mines and fire. 

    c. Individual. 

    d. Alarm systems.

13. Traveling discipline.

    a. Speed (day and night). 

    b. Timings to be maintained. 

    c. Point of departure and intermediate points (control points). 

    d. Use of guides. 

    e. Driving discipline. 

    f. Use of lights.

14. Halts.

    a. Place and duration. 

    b. Security measures to be taken. Use of vehicle lights, if necessary.

15. Crossing of streams/rivers.

    a. Bridges and points. 

    b. Various unconventional means. Rules and precautions to be taken.

16. Action to be taken in emergencies.

    a. Allocation of tasks. 

    b. Fire discipline and replenishment.

17. Attitudes towards and relationship with the local inhabitants.

18. Orders regarding the transport of civilians.

19. Orders for the inclusion of civilian vehicles in the column. Legal aspects.

Logistics and Administration

20. Rations and water.

    a. Type and number of days to be carried. 

    b. Preparation of food. Support/assistance available along the route. 

    c. Water resources and precautions to be taken.

21. Ammunition.

    a. Initial issue. 

    b. Distribution. 

    c. Levels to be maintained.

22. Fuel and lubricants.

    a. Initial issue. 

    b. Levels to be maintained. 

    c. Existing support Organization or other installations along the route.

23. Medical.

    a. Preventive measures. 

    b. Treatment and evacuation of casualties. 

    c. Existing support organizations and other installations along the route. 

    d. Sanitary measures during halts.

24. Special equipment.

    a. Special support vehicles and equipment. 

    b. Equipment for the removal of obstacles.

25. Breakdowns. Orders and actions with regard to vehicles bogged down and/or broken down.

26. Refueling.

    a. Halts. 

    b. Refueling discipline. 

    c. Existing organizations and other installations along the route. 

    d. Emergency refueling.

27. Embussing and debussing drills.

28. Loading and unloading vehicles.

    a. Separation of classes of supplies. 

    b. Load for vehicle type.

Command and Signals

29. Position of the commander and second in command.

    a. During traveling. 

    b. During stops.

30. Maintaining contact.

    a. Visual.

        1. By signals. 

        2. Distances to be maintained.

    b. Radio.

        1. Frequencies and schedules. 

        2. Call signs including ground to air. 

        3. Special instructions. 

        4. Deception measures.

    c. Movement control points. 

    d. Nicknames and/or code words.



1. The route card should include a sketch of the route showing:

    a. Distance in kilometers. 

    b. Settlements. 

    c. Local resources of: 

        1. Water. 

        2. Fuel and lubricants. 

        3. Food. 

        4. Accommodation.

        5. Location of friendly units. 

        6. Location of critical contact or possible contact.




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