It might surprise some to learn that terror­ists (or freedom fighters, depending on one’s point of view) are often equipped with superior, more modern weapons than the government forces they are fighting. This was certainly true in Rhodesia, where government troops were also frequently outnumbered by as many as forty-to-one.

  Lacking the manpower resources and technology, the Rhodesian Security Force’s (RSF) success in battle after battle against ZIPRA and ZANLA must be attributed to the following:

1.       Superior individual troop training.

2.       More involved and direct command structure.

3.       Generally shorter and more accessible supply routes.

4.        The use of air power.

  The following charts below give a side-by-side comparison of the arsenals of the Rhodesian Defense Forces and the ter­rorist organizations, along with the arsenals of the coun­tries that supported these organizations (commonly re­ferred to as the “frontline states”). The defense forces of both Zambia and Mozambique were directly involved in the fighting between the RSF and terrorist insurgents.

  The constant threat of air intervention in the war was something that had to be considered whenever cross-border incursions were planned. Both Zambia and Mo­zambique had far larger and more modern Air Forces dur­ing the last two years of the war. Direct intervention would have witnessed results as basic as in a rock fight. Even had Rhodesia won the air battle, it would have im­mediately lost the war.

  Raids into Mozambique almost always involved con­tact with FRELIMO, and the threat of armored interven­tion by tanks was a likelihood that had to be considered in all RSF plans.

  Rhodesian intelligence had access to ZIPRA’s long-term military plans. Developed by the Russians, these plans called for short-term conventional warfare against the RSF. Upon conclusion of this phase of the war, ZIPRA would besiege Mugabe’s forces, and ZANLA would find itself unable to offer a defense against a massive conventional army. Nkomo’s army was to be supported by Russian-trained and Russian-advised ar­mored contingents of a least divisional strength.

  Rhodesia’s military units, particularly the Special Forces, could not have carried on the war without resup­ply from captured arsenals. The Selous Scouts were en­tirely equipped with such weapons; their roll mandated the use of enemy materials of war. It was a simple matter to resupply with captured equipment, especially ammuni­tion, when on cross border raids. Weapons of choice, were frequently the enemy’s own weapons of war.

  Cost, of course, is another compelling argument for the use of captured equipment. Rhodesia’s lack of foreign exchange was a controlling factor in the planning of mili­tary operations. For example, the ammunition for the 30mm cannon used in the Hawker Hunter jet, cost $12.00 (Rhodesian currency) per round, which translated to $18.00 U.S. per round of ammunition. The Hunter aircraft carried four Aden 30mm cannons, each cannon firing 1,200 to 1,400 rounds per minute (rpm). The actual cost of this ammunition became a critical factor in military plan­ning. Here was a unique situation for Rhodesia, a war material readily available but very expensive.

  As an interesting aside, it might be noted that the pilots’ skill was such that single round kills on non-armored vehicles were documented. One Hunter pilot from Texas—where else? — boasted of his shooting prow­ess, resulting in a rather sizeable bet concerning his abil­ity. The intrepid young man bet that he could hit a gar­bage can from his Hunter with one round. The can was placed in the middle of a clearing at the range outside Que-Que. The pilot took off from Thornhill, and his deed was as good as his word. The can was bronzed, and kept on display in the Officers Mess.

  The following tables below are not exhaustive, for many sub­types of weapons were used in the Rhodesian War. How­ever, they do show the dominant types and will give you an overview of the weapons used.